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retit·ecl after the same length of service. 
under this assumption, a member discharged 
30 years might, by the terms of section 5, be 
pension amounting to 30/25 of one-half of his 
since the section authorizes a pension ''in the pro-
that the number of years he has served . . . bears to 
years.'' On the other hand, a person who 
retired under section 2 after being employed for 30 years 
receive a pension amounting only to half his salary. 
If there is any doubt as to the proper interpretation 
the ordinance, we are, of course, required to construe the 
liberally in favor of the applicant so as to carry 
their beneficent policy. (See Terry v. City of Berkeley, 
Cal.2d 698, 701-702 [263 P.2d 833] ; England v. City of 
Beach, 27 Cal.2d 343, 346-347 [163 P.2d 865]; Gibson v. 
of San Diego, 25 Cal.2d 930, 935 [156 P.2d 737] .) We 
conclude that section 5 is not applicable to plaintiff and that 
is entitled to a pension under section 2 (a). 
'fhe judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Carter, ,T., Schauer, .T., Spenee, J., and McComb, 
concurred. 
[S. F. No. 19492. In Bank. June 28, 1956.] 
SADIE I. SUTTON, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCI-
DEN'r COMMISSION et al., Respondents. 
Workmen's Compensation - Continuing Jurisdiction Over 
Awards.-The continuing jurisdiction given the Industrial Ac-
cident Commission over its awards by Lab. Code, § 5803, in-
cludes the right to diminish, increase or terminate, within 
the limits mentioned in the workmen's compensation laws, any 
compensation awarded on the ground that the disability of 
the person in whose favor the award was made has recurred, 
increased, diminished or terminated, but such power is quali-
fied by § 5804, declaring that no award of compensation shall 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 160; Am.Jur., 
Workmen's Compensation, § 484 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4] Workmen's Compensation, § 203; 
Workmen's Compensation, § 141; [3] Workmen's Compensa-
§ 205; [5] Statutes, § 180(2); [6) Workmen's Compensation, 
203, 205. 
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sion may determine the 
there no restriction on the time com-
mission may act on such proceedings commenced within five 
years. 
!d.-Continuing Jurisdiction Over Awards-Time When Power 
May Be Exercised.-Lab. Code, § 5804, does not prescribe the 
time within which proceedings to amend or rescind an award 
of the Industrial Accident Commission may be commenced 
but flatly declares that no award "shall" be rescinded 0; 
amended after five years from the date of injury, and this may 
not be construed as allowing five years in which application 
for relief may be made or as allowing the commission, in case 
a petition to amend the award is made next to the last day 
of the five-year period after the injury, to act on the peti-
tion after such period has elapsed. (Disapproving contrary 
language in Larsen v. Industrial Ace. Com., 125 Cal.App. 13, 
13 P.2d 850.) 
[4] !d.-Continuing Jurisdiction Over Awards.-A proceeding on 
application by the employer's carrier to amend an award of 
the Industrial Accident Commission may not be taken under 
Lab. Code, § 5410, relating to new and further disability, but 
must necessarily be instituted under §§ 5803, 5804, since § 5410 
refers only to a proceeding by the "injured employee." 
[5] Statutes-Construction-Departmental Construction.-A for· 
mer administrative construction contrary to statutes cannot 
control. 
[6] Workmen's Compensation - Continuing Jurisdiction Over 
Awards.-The fact that a different period of time is given to 
injured employees in which to file an application for new 
and further disability (Lab. Code, § 5410) than to employers 
or their carriers ( § 5804) in which an award of the Indus-
trial Accident Commission may be altered does not "v'"""''""'"' 
a denial of due process and equal protection of the law 
Const., 14th Amend., § 1; see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 25, 
§§ 11, 21), since there are manifest differences between an 
jured employee and his employer and the employer's """"""'u'o" 
carrier on which the Legislature could base a 
classification. 
[2) See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 134; 
Workmen's Compensation, § 409. 
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lVIullm & Pilippi for Hespondeuts. 
,J.~On April 2, 1948, IYas 
the eourse of her employment, and on March 14, 
Accident Commission awaeded her a 
rating of 100 per eent. On April 1, 196~!. the 1wxt 
to the last day of the five-year period after the injury, her 
's insuranee earrier filed a petition with the eommis-
to lmve the award amended to reduce the percentage of 
JWrmanent elisa bility. After proceedings were had the com-
mission set aside its a·ward and ordered that petitioner's 
permanent disability be reduced to 411/~ per cent. 
Petitioner seeks to have the last mentioned order annulled. 
on the grounds that: (1) The commission was without 
clietion to make the order after the five-year period under 
workmen's compensation laws (Lab. Code, § 5804); (2) 
1949 amendment (Stats. 1949, ch. 677, § 2) to section 5804 
which increased the period of time from 245 weeks to five 
years should not be retroactively applied to the instant pro-
ceedings; the findings of the commission do not support 
order sought to be annulled. In view of the result reached 
herein that the commission should not have made the order 
after the expiration of the five-year period and that the order 
must be annulled on the first of the grounds heretofore set 
it is unnecessary to discuss the other contentions. 
Section 5803 of the I1abor Code provides generally 
that the commission has continuing jurisdiction over its 
awards and at any time upon notice and opportunity to b<~ 
heard it may rescind, alter or amend snch award, good 
appearing therefor. 'l'his power includes the right 
to diminish, increase or terminate, within the limits men-
tioned in the workmen's compensation laws, any eonqwnsatim1 
awarded on the ground that the disability of tht, person in 
favor the award was made has t'<'eurrcd. 
diminished or 1Prmillated. '!'hat section is q11alified, how-
by section 6804 which reads: ''No a ward of compcmm-
tion shall be rescinded, altered, or amended after five years 
794 SuTTON v. INDUSTRIAIJ Ace. CoJ~.L [46 C.2d 
from the date of the Provided, however, that 
an award has been made finding that there was employment 
and the time to petition for a rehearing or reconsideration 
or review has expired or such petition if made has been 
determined, the commission upon a petition to reopen shall 
not have the power to find that there was no employment." 
(See St~bseqnent Injuries FnnrZ v. Indttstrial Ace. Com., 39 
Cal.2d 83 P.2d 889].) 'fhere is another provision which 
should be considered in connection with section 5804. Section 
5410 of the Labor Code provides: "Nothing in this chapter 
shall bar the right of any injured employee to institute 
proceedings for the collection of compensation within five 
years after the date of the injury upon the ground that the 
original jnjury has caused new and further disability. The 
jurisdiction of the commission in such cases shall be a con-
tinuing jurisdiction at all times within such period. This 
section does not extend the limitation provided in Section 
5407.'' The ''chapter'' referred to is that dealing with 
"bmitations of Proceedings" commencing with section 5400. 
[2] The commission claims that inasmuch as the carrier's 
upplication to amend the award was filed with it within the 
fivc-yrar period, the commission could make the amendment 
after the five years had expired. It has been held in con-
sidering scchon 5410, sttpra, that an application by an em-
ployee for new and further disability, if filed within the five-
year period, is timely and the commission may determine 
the question after the expiration of the period. (Gobel v. 
Industrial Ace. Com., 1 Cal.2d 100 [33 P.2d 413] ; Fttrness 
Pacific, Ltd. v. Industrial Ace Com., 74 Cal.App.2d 324 [168 
P.2d 7611; Hcnr·y Cowell Lime & Cement Co. v. Indus-
trial Ace. Corn., 211 Cal. 154 [294 P. 703, 72 .A.J_..l=t. 1118] ; 
IVestvaco etc. Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 186 Cal.App.2d 
GO [288 P.2d 300] ; Pacific Indcrn. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
85 Cal.App.2d 490 (193 P.2d 117]; see Douglas Aircraft Co. 
\'.Industrial Ace. Cmn., 31 Cal.2d 853 [193 P.2d 468].) 
This holding is in accord with the express wording of 
section 5410, S1tpra. 'l'hat section provides that an 
jured employee'' may ''institute,'' that is, commence ur<Jce,ed· 
ings for eompensation within five years after the date of 
injury on the ground that the original injury has 
11\~W and fmther disability. There is no restriction on 
time within whicl1 the commission may act, hence it 
act on the proceedings commenced within the five 
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the other lwud, scdiol!s fioO:J an(l snp1·a, 
are in i he instant ease, are in ilw of 
eode with "Findings and Awards' and there is 
in section GB04 about the time within which 
to amend or r(,:-;eind an award may be comnwnced. 'l'he 
is a fiat declaration i hat no award "shall'' be 
reseiudt•;l or ammJded after five years from the date of 
'J'hc differeut lauguage in the two sections (54] 0 
alld 51l04) indicates that a different rule was intended. \Vlwn 
!Jegislature intended that a proceeding was timely when 
eommenced within the period, even though decided later, 
it so stated (!Jab. Code, § 5410, supra). Its failure to so 
in section 5804 indicates that it did not intend the 
~a me result. t It is true that the foregoing interpretation 
or section 5804 means that five years' time is not given in 
which to apply for relief under section 5803, because obviously 
application on a date such as the next to last day could not 
be decided until after the time limited, but section 5804 
docs not purport to allow five years in which application may 
b,; made for relief (as does § 5410). On the contrary, it 
provides that the commission may not amend or rescind its 
award after that time. 
'rhe distinction between the two sections was recognized 
in W estvaco etc. Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., S1tpra, 136 
CaLApp.2d 60, 63, where the court, after stating that the 
was whether the proceeding was under section 
5JrJO or 580:5 and 5804, said: '"l'he petition of April 9, 195i5, 
barred by the provisions of section 5410 expressly limit-
the time within whieh a petition for new and further 
disability may be :filed to five years after the injury. If 
the commission were attempting to exercise under section 
5803 a continuing jurisdiction to amend or alter an order, 
order amending would be void because of the limitation 
of such power expressed in section 5804. . . . The commission, 
within the five-year period, is authorized by section 5803 'to 
5804) has been said to be a jurisdictional limitation. (Douglas 
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, 31 Cal.2d 853, 855.) 
~,Compare section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides 
that an application for relief from default must be made in six months 
and section 660 which provides that the court has no power to pass 
on a motion for a new trial after 60 days after notice of entry of 
judgment, etc. 
under 
there was new and further uu'i:tiJ'lHLv 
then make an award therefor This latter award 
made after the expiration of the '"'"''-"'3 " 
for it had been :filed within that period. 
"It is well settled that the commission has power to con-
tinue its jurisdiction to determine new and further disability 
the period, where application is made within 
''If the true and exclusive meaning of section 5410 is 
that there can be no new and further disability application 
where there was a permanent disability award, then the 
employee here must be denied any increase in permanent 
disability over the percentage found in the :first order, be-
l;ause the commission failed to amend that order within the 
:five-year period and his present condition does not constitute 
'new and further disability' within the meaning of that 
section. . . . During the :five-year period the commission 
could under section 5803 amend or alter its previous order, 
or could act under section 5410. After the five-year period, 
only section 5410 can be used, and then, only if a prior proceed-
is filed ttnder it!' (Emphasis added.) (See also Broad-
way-Locust Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 92 Cal.App.2d 287 
l206 P.2d 856] ; Ftwness Pacific, Ltd. v. Indttstrial Ac<i. Com., 
supra, 74 Cal.App.2d 324.) DougLas Aircraft Co. v. Industrial 
Ace. C01n., supra, 31 Cal.2d 853, while not entirely clear, 
merely follows Gobel v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, 1 Cal.2d 
100 (decided under the earlier version of § 5410) which held 
that the commission could pass on an application for new 
and further disability after the specified period if the applica-
tion was :filed within it. Larsen v. Industrial Ace. Com., 125 
Cal.App. 13 [13 P.2d 850], is distinguishable but the language 
therein contrary to the foregoing interpretation is hereby 
disapproved. 
[4] In the instant case the proceeding could not have 
been taken under section 5410 because the employer's 
filed the application. It was necessarily under sections 
and 5804. Section 5410 refers only to a proceeding by 
"injured employee." By no device may that phrase 
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given to them by the commission. That 
but in any event, a former administrative 
to the statutes cannot eontrol. 
40 Cal.2d 751 P.2d 
Thr carrier urges that the i'n>•ocr.mn 
dne proerss and 
different period of time is 
than to employers or their carriers 
in which an award may be altered. There are manifest 
bet\veen an and his 
the latter's insurance carrier upon which the "'~""'o'u 
base a reasonable classification. 'fhe whole 
of workmen's compensation laws recognizes such a distinction. 
The distinction has been made in statutes regulating attorue,v 's 
which have been upheld. (See Marezeski v. Pittsburgh 
Steel 01·e Co., 154 1\linn. 536 [191 N.W. 743]; Marshall v. 
81 Cal.App. 98 [252 P. 1075]; Ahmed's Case, 278 Mass. 
[17!1 N.E. 684, 79 A.IJ.H. 669]; ]'{orman's Cnsr, 278 Mass. 
[180 N.E. 288, 82 A.I1.R. 885] .) 
awal'(1 is annulled. 
<iibson, C. .T., Shenk, ,J., Schannr, .f., and 
:\l .J., concurred. 
The petition of' respondent GuaranUcr' lnsnnw<·<: Company 
fo1· rPtJearing was rlenie<1 ,Jn l,v 24, ] D56. 
\H. R. Const., Fourteenth Amendment, §]; soc Cal. Const., art. VI, 
art. I, §§ 11, 21.) 
